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Should desperate volunteers be included in randomised 
controlled trials? 
 
Abstract 
Randomised controlled trials (RCTs) sometimes recruit participants 
who are desperate to receive the experimental treatment.  Some claim 
this practice is unethical for at least three reasons.  The first is that 
the notion of equipoise, which is often used as a justification for 
running a RCT, is subjective and value-based.  Desperate volunteers 
are clearly not in equipoise and it is their values that should take 
precedence.  The second is that clinicians who enter patients onto 
trials are disavowing their therapeutic obligation to deliver the best 
treatment to patients; they are following trial protocols rather than 
delivering individualised care.  Research is not treatment; its ethical 
justification is different.  Consent is crucial.  This leads to the third 
reason: desperate volunteers do not give a proper consent; they are, in 
effect, coerced.  We begin our reply by advocating a notion of equipoise 
based on, first, expert knowledge and, second, widely shared values.  
Where such collective, expert equipoise exists there is a prima facie 
case for a RCT.  Next we argue that trial entry does not involve 
clinicians’ disavowing their therapeutic obligation; individualised care 
based on whims and fancies is not in patients’ best interest.  Finally, 
we argue that where equipoise exists it is acceptable to limit access to 
experimental agents.  In the cases desperate volunteers are not 
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coerced because their desperation does not translate into a right to 
receive what they desire.   
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Introduction  
The following quotes come from people involved in a recent neonatal 
randomised controlled trial (RCT) who were interviewed as part of a 
qualitative sub-study.1 The first is from a mother who gave consent: 
“I remember saying to him, ‘Oh great, great, like some 
effing placebo’ is what I said to him; so, no, I totally 
understood that idea, so I was kind of glad [because the 
baby received active treatment.]” 
 
The second is from a clinician: 
“… it’s easy for someone to put a gun to your head and 
say it’s your decision.  And the gun being that their baby 
is born and is damaged and is needing a lot of 
resuscitation and here we are saying, look there’s a trial 
happening and this is the only thing available, and there’s 
nothing else available…” 
 
The quotes illustrate the desperate volunteer problem: RCTs 
sometimes recruit patients (or their proxies) who are desperate to be 
placed on one particular arm of the study.  They consent because the 
treatment they desire is available only through that study and are 
disappointed if randomised to the “wrong” arm.  The problem arises 
usually where the RCT is investigating a new treatment into a serious 
or terminal illness where current treatment options are limited.   
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Some argue directly that it is unethical to recruit desperate volunteers 
to RCTs.2;3 Others imply it is unethical by arguing that it is right to 
recruit only participants who are indifferent between treatment arms.4
The issue has been discussed most in relation to patients with serious 
and terminal illness including Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), 
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)3;5 and variant 
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD).6 In the United Kingdom, parents of 
two young men with vCJD challenged in court the decision of doctors 
not to use a drug that was still in the early (animal) research stage.6
This opens the possibility that desperate volunteers could similarly 
challenge a placebo-controlled RCT.   
 
In this article we defend the recruitment of desperate volunteers into 
RCTs provided the condition of equipoise is met.  As this is a term 
used in different ways we first need to set out what we mean by it.  We 
then set out our argument in more detail and examine it in relation to 
the arguments of those who believe it unethical to recruit desperate 
volunteers.  (Throughout this discussion we shall use the term 
“equipoise”; others prefer “uncertainty”.7;8 This distinction makes no 
difference of substance here.)   
Equipoise  
It is often said that for a RCT to be ethical a condition of equipoise 
must prevail.  Roughly this means that there should be no grounds to 
prefer any particular arm of the trial.  Early discussion of equipoise 
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focused on whether the condition should pertain to each individual 
clinician.9-11 The problem is that clinicians often have hunches, 
anecdotes and small trial evidence that lead them to prefer a 
treatment arm.  Freedman argued that it is ethical to conduct such a 
RCT provided that a condition of collective (or what he termed 
“clinical”) equipoise exists, that is, where there is sufficient doubt in 
the clinical community as a whole.12;13 The notion of equipoise we 
intend to use in our argument is akin to Freedman’s collective 
equipoise (although our emphasis on the value element within 
equipoise is not matched in Freedman’s own account).  Now let us 
turn to problems in applying this notion in the justification for 
recruiting desperate volunteers.   
 
Criticism 1: Equipoise is subjective and value-based 
Being in equipoise implies being uncertain which of two or more 
treatments is better and, therefore, which to choose.  However, there 
are ambiguities here in the notions of uncertainty, being better and 
choice.  Let us take these in turn. 
 
1. Uncertainty 
RCTs are powered to avoid error to a certain degree.  Typically they 
are set up to show an effect to a level where p L 0.05.  This means that 
the researcher can say, roughly, that she will be wrong on 5/100 
occasions if she concludes that there is an effect.  However, setting the 
p-value at this level seems arbitrary.  Why not choose, say, p = 0.07 or 
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0.03 (where the researcher can say she’ll be wrong on 7/100 or 3/100 
occasions if she concludes there is an effect)?   
 
Gifford tackles this question by drawing a distinction between policy 
decisions and present patient decisions.14 One may not have sufficient 
evidence for a treatment to recommend it as part of policy guidelines; 
nonetheless, there may be enough evidence, particularly trends from a 
RCT, to prefer a treatment arm for one’s particular patient.  Gifford 
suggests that clinicians may have a different threshold for initiating a 
treatment for a particular patient and for making a policy 
recommendation.  Any desperate volunteer is likely to take a 
“particular patient” view, desiring the treatment even though it is not 
yet proven fully enough for a policy decision.  Furthermore, in reality, 
the equipoise is not balanced concerning the treatment about which 
evidence of effectiveness is sought, since phase III RCTs only receive 
funding if there is some early phase trial or case study evidence which 
suggests that the experimental arm might be more effective in treating 
an illness.15-17 
2. Being better 
A treatment’s being “better” is not a matter of fact, it is a judgment 
based on the facts.18 For example, it might be that, say, mastectomy 
offers a slightly higher chance of survival at five years than does 
lumpectomy.  However, mastectomy is more disfiguring.  Which is 
thought “better” will depend on the individual’s values: some will 
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prefer the greater chance of survival, others the less disfiguring 
surgery.  If values are crucial to equipoise then surely it is the values 
of participants that matter most; they should be in equipoise if their 
participation is to be ethical.4;19 
3. Choice 
Uncertainty about a treatment’s efficacy does not necessarily translate 
to uncertainty about whether one would choose it.  Even if one had no 
idea whether a treatment might turn out to be efficacious one might 
still want it.  Typically this would happen where one’s current 
situation is dire and a treatment offers hope, distant though it may 
be.  These ambiguities render equipoise incapable of providing 
justification for RCTs.  Indeed, on one account, this was Fried’s point 
when he originated the term “equipoise”.20 
Criticism 2: Equipoise disguises the therapeutic misconception 
The opponents of equipoise say that when clinicians enter patients 
into RCTs they disavow the therapeutic obligation to recommend and 
deliver the best treatment.  This is because such clinicians no longer 
deliver individualised care.  Instead they are committed to a trial 
regime.  This has a number of effects, for example:  
• Such regimes are focused on particular endpoints that are of 
import to the researchers but may not be of the same import to 
the patient.  A clinician might, for example, see that some side 
effects are particularly important to a patient (as tremor would 
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be to a concert pianist, for example) and can treat accordingly.  
In a RCT, the patient’s values are set to one side.   
• A clinician committed to a trial regime cannot make subtle 
alterations in dosage.   
• She cannot follow her personal belief that the balance of 
evidence favours one treatment rather than another.   
• Participants in RCTs may be subject to (clinically) unnecessary 
additional procedures. 
• Participants in RCTs may receive inert and pointless placebos.   
 
Opponents of equipoise argue that its use reflects and reinforces a 
false identification of research with treatment (the “therapeutic 
misconception”).10;11;21-25 Being “in equipoise” is supposed to reflect a 
clinician’s being unsure of the best action for a patient: the options 
include trial entry or individualised care.  Equipoise, insofar as it 
means anything, simply reflects a general lack of knowledge of the 
effects of treatment on a whole class of patients; in practice, clinicians 
will always have some notion of which course of action they would 
prefer to take with a particular patient, including the need for subtle 
alterations of dose and so forth. 
 
Thus, because equipoise is subjective and value-based it cannot 
provide an objective standard that justifies the running of RCTs.  
Furthermore, equipoise amongst clinicians about the effectiveness of a 
treatment cannot justify disavowing the therapeutic obligation.  RCTs 
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can still be justified, but their justification will be based on a different 
set of principles to those of treatment.10;26;27 Where beneficence and 
the best interest of the patient are central to treatment, autonomy and 
informed consent are central to research.  It is permissible to disavow 
the therapeutic obligation provided the risks are acceptable and, 
especially, provided the patient gives informed consent. 
 
Criticism 3: equipoise is used to justify coerced trial entry 
Desperate volunteers provide a vivid illustration of the inadequacy of 
equipoise.  To desperate volunteers, the setting aside of the 
therapeutic obligation is clear; they strongly believe there is a better 
alternative than the one being presented to them by their clinician.  
Similarly, the failure of fully informed consent is clear; their consent is 
not truly voluntary; they are effectively coerced into trial entry.  Their 
subsequent anger at this injustice is shown by their campaigns and 
court cases.5
We shall argue that at least in some cases it is not unjust to recruit 
desperate volunteers.  We do this by tackling the three criticisms.  
 
Reply to criticism that equipoise is subjective and value based 
Our first task is to suggest a conception of equipoise that is robust 
enough to do some work in justifying RCTs.  The criticism that it 
cannot do this arises from three ambiguities. 
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The first ambiguity concerns uncertainty: the emergence of trends 
undermines equipoise for present patient decisions before we reach 
the level of statistical certainty necessary for policy decisions.  
However, Yusuf looked at the data from a number of studies into 
cardiac treatments.28 Early trends were often deceptive.  In one study, 
aspirin appeared little better than placebo as a treatment following a 
heart attack when 3000 patients had been recruited.  It was only 
when 16,000 had been recruited that the clear trend favouring aspirin 
emerged.  More strikingly, a study of atenolol following heart attack 
had a clear trend suggesting it was harmful that did not reverse until 
300 deaths had occurred and several thousand patients been 
recruited.  Yusuf’s finding is repeated elsewhere.29;30 This suggests 
that Gifford is wrong to postulate a yawning gap between the evidence 
ethically required for decisions about individual patients and that 
required for policy decisions.  If doctors in the atenolol example had 
made “particular patient” decisions then, first, the trial may have 
collapsed and never have uncovered the truth and, second, the 
particular patients themselves would have been harmed.  Turning to 
the statistical limits set in trials, these are not arbitrary but rather are 
those that experience suggests lead to reliable results in well run 
RCTs; those that allow for early misleading trends.   
 
Hence there is no reason necessarily to expect clinicians to form 
strong preferences for a treatment for their individual patients before 
they form an opinion about its use for patients in general.  Indeed, 
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there is something intuitively odd about the idea that they would.  
From this point we are able to develop a notion of collective equipoise 
that is more than the headcount of personal clinicians’ opinions, one 
that is best represented by the Data Monitoring and Ethics 
Committees (DMEC).  They have an overview of all the data and are 
able to judge this data against the level of statistical proof required by 
the protocol.  Whilst the DMEC is in equipoise, collective equipoise 
can be said to obtain. 
 
What of the second ambiguity concerning the meaning of a 
treatment’s being better?  The DMEC might be in equipoise over 
certain endpoints but these might not be of import to the patient.  
However, this disjunction in values is likely to be rare.  In most cases, 
the endpoints of value to researchers, such as disease-free survival, 
will also be of great value to patients.  Were this not the case then the 
desperate volunteer problem would be echoed in many RCTs; for 
example, it would be commonplace for people to complain about the 
group into which they are randomised.  There seems no evidence for 
this.30 In those rare cases of potential significant disagreement over 
the value of endpoints researchers will need to ensure that participant 
equipoise is present (as in the mastectomy/lumpectomy and concert 
pianist examples; also see a case described by Lilford31).  In the case 
of desperate volunteers, however, their concerns are with survival and 
quality of life; these are matters which researchers will hope the 
experimental agent tested in the relevant RCT will improve. 
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We believe this gives us enough to posit a robust conception of clinical 
equipoise.  It is represented by experts conceiving and funding bodies 
peer-reviewing trials before they start and the DMEC and TSC during 
a trial. It is based on uncertainty about the effectiveness of one or 
more trial treatments around endpoints that are likely to be widely 
shared by clinicians and patients.  Where it exists, there is a prima 
facie case for a RCT. 
 
Clearly this “expert view” account of collective equipoise does not 
equate to having no idea about the efficacy of treatments being tested 
in a RCT.  RCTs begin with a hope that a new treatment will be 
effective.  This hope is based on evidence from other sources (such as 
phase I and II trials) and from positing a plausible mechanism.  
However, such evidence is limited both statistically and in terms of 
evidence of treatment effectiveness in the clinical situation.  RCTs aim 
to look at a wider range of endpoints including compliance, 
unexpected side effects and the chance that early indications of 
effectiveness were rogue results.  It is this whole picture that will 
determine whether or not a new treatment is deemed an improvement 
or not.  And the judgment of this will be a function of values.  For 
example, a treatment may extend life but at the cost of an awful side 
effect, such as uncontrollable nausea.  Thus, when setting up a RCT 
clinicians may have strong grounds to believe a treatment is more 
effective in terms of a particular endpoint; what they don’t know is its 
value overall. 
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Hence, the role of values in collective equipoise means that equipoise 
does not equate to epistemological uncertainty.  This is seen in 
another way: sometimes clinicians can be epistemologically unsure of 
the effectiveness of a treatment but not be in equipoise about its use.  
An example of this is the argument that a RCT is unacceptable in 
relation to the use of Quinacrine in vCJD because the prognosis on 
the best alternative treatment is so dire.32 In situations such as these 
the clinicians are in agreement with the desperate volunteers; they are 
not in equipoise.  Hence it does not follow that wherever there is an 
experimental treatment whose effectiveness is unknown there is 
collective equipoise.  Ex hypothesi lack of knowledge only justifies a 
RCT where it exists alongside collective, expert equipoise. 
 
However, perhaps this only reinforces the problem of the third 
ambiguity.  It remains the case that epistemological uncertainty is not 
necessarily matched by uncertainty of desire and choice.  Whilst the 
values of clinicians may leave them in equipoise, the values of 
desperate volunteers do not; they will clutch at straws.  Does 
collective equipoise justify limiting their options such that the straw 
they are forced to clutch is RCT entry?  Proponents of the idea that 
research is a fundamentally different activity to treatment would say it 
is not.  The only possible justification for RCT entry is informed 
consent, something absent where consent is coerced.  Hence we must 
look at the notions of therapeutic obligation and misconception.   
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Reply to criticism that equipoise disguises therapeutic 
misconception 
Our response to this criticism is that there is no necessary clash 
between, first, delivering the best available treatment for a patient 
and, second, resolving uncertainty about treatment.  An aim of well-
designed trials is for RCTs to resolve uncertainty by delivering the best 
treatment.33 In making this claim it is crucial to separate it from a 
different dispute about the use of placebos.  Much discussion of 
therapeutic misconception originates in the United States where, 
whilst the regulatory Food and Drug Administration (FDA) stipulates 
new drugs may be tested against a known effective alternative34 there 
is a tendency to prefer placebo trials in such situations.35 Like many, 
we believe this to be unethical and to contravene the Helsinki 
accord.36-38 Entering patients onto a trial using placebos in this way 
would certainly violate the therapeutic obligation.  However, when 
correctly used, placebos represent the best alternative treatment.17 
Provided this is so, clinicians unsure of which treatment is best are 
acting both in the best interest of the patient and in the interest of 
ending uncertainty when they enter patients into RCTs. 
 
What, though, of the claim that clinicians entering patients into RCTs 
cannot give individualised care, for example, by subtly altering 
treatment regimes?  Our response is to ask the basis of this care.  
Presumably the RCT regimen the clinician wishes subtly to alter is 
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based upon the best evidence available at the time; what else does she 
know?  The claim that clinical judgment is impaired by RCT regimens 
seems to parallel the claim that such judgment is impaired by 
evidence based medicine (EBM) in general.39 Hence the response to 
both claims can be the same: ‘Psychological research on problem 
solving and decision making has contributed to these developments 
[that is, evidence-based medicine and decision analysis] by showing 
that expert clinical judgment was not as expert as we had believed it 
to be’40 (p. S135).  There is plenty of evidence showing the flaws in 
non-evidence based clinical judgment;41;42 participants in RCTs are 
unlikely to be harmed by being deprived of it.  There may be rare 
occasions when particular patients have features that make them 
exceptional, as in the concert pianist example.  However, most of us 
hover around the average and can often be treated on shared features: 
try telling an actuary that we are all individuals.43 The bizarre 
outcome of the “individualised care” argument is that, to paraphrase 
Smithell’s famous dictum, it appears unethical to give an unproven 
treatment to half my patients, but ethical to give it to all of them.44 
To summarise: we have suggested that equipoise can be robust 
enough to provide a prima facie case for a RCT.  We have denied that 
RCTs necessarily involve a disavowal of the therapeutic obligation.  
Nonetheless, a central element of the case against the involvement of 
desperate volunteers in RCTs remains.  This is that they are effectively 
coerced into taking part.  Relatedly, given that equipoise is a function 
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of values, shouldn’t the values of participants prevail through the 
mechanism of (voluntary) consent?4 It is to this we now turn. 
 
Reply to criticism that equipoise is used to justify coerced trial 
entry 
In the first place, we should note that our argument constitutes a 
rebuttal of the “difference position”: we have argued that therapeutic 
research is not fundamentally different from other therapy.  As such, 
it is governed by the same principles, including attention to the best 
interest of patients.  It follows that one way of viewing the difference in 
equipoise between clinicians and desperate volunteers in RCTs is as 
one to do with what constitutes best interest.  Why might clinicians be 
in equipoise in situations where desperate volunteers clearly are not?   
 
The Quinacrine example is a case where the prospect for the patient is 
dire and the potential for harm from the experimental treatment 
almost non-existent.  Such cases are not typical even in terminal or 
life-threatening cases.  New treatments or procedures that aim to 
delay death, reduce the occurrence of disability and so forth can have 
unexpected and unwanted effects.  A treatment might delay death but 
create unbearable nausea, for example.  There is almost never a 
choice between, say, immediate death and a possible miracle cure.  
Thus one reason for the difference between clinicians and desperate 
volunteers is that the latter’s hope for a cure obscures the reality.  As 
one parent we spoke to put it,  
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“We fully understood what he wanted to do in terms of 
treatment … we fully understood the side effects if 
there was going to be any, or the risks involved, but 
obviously whatever anyone tells you all you listen to is 
that your child is damaged …” 
 
Typically, from the standpoint of collective equipoise it will be 
important to discover whether treatments are effective, to allocate 
resources effectively, to avoid long-term side effects and so forth.  
From the standpoint of the desperate volunteer these considerations 
will be of little import: they will clutch at straws to avoid the harm 
they face now.  RCTs limit their options; the straw they are forced to 
clutch is trial entry.  Is this constrained consent justifiable? 
 
Consent to research is generally thought to have two main functions.  
The first is the protection of the patient against either exposure to a 
harmful treatment or denial of a therapeutic one.  Historically this is 
the most important function.  The Nuremberg Code and Helsinki 
declarations developed from the exposure of horrific clinical trials that 
would never have taken place had voluntary consent been 
respected.45;46 The second function is protection of and respect for the 
participant’s autonomy.  This function has taken on increasing 
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importance as our culture has moved away from endorsing medical 
paternalism. 
 
Our argument thus far concerning desperate volunteers enables us 
now to set aside the first function of consent; we do not defend RCTs 
that harm patients through exposure to or denial of experimental 
treatments.  Thus the main objection to the recruitment of desperate 
volunteers is related to autonomy: researchers are manipulating 
options in such a way as to ensure that desperate volunteers consent 
to take part in RCTs.  Such manipulation is generally taken to 
undermine the voluntariness of consent.47 It may even constitute 
coercion.  This alone is enough to make it wrong.   
 
However, we do not live in a libertarian society in which autonomy is 
considered an overarching good.  Throughout Western countries 
people are denied access to therapeutic treatments they desire in a 
number of ways, such as when the treatments are available on 
prescription only, are illegal or unaffordable.  If one believes this to be 
sometimes or always acceptable then, by extension, one must believe 
in the principle that desire for a therapy does not translate into a right 
to have it.  In the case of desperate volunteers, these are patients who 
strongly believe in the efficacy of a treatment but who lack the 
evidence for that belief.  Their strength of belief and desire does not 
translate into a right to receive that treatment.  The terms “coercion” 
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and “manipulation of options” do not apply here because patients are 
not wronged when denied access to unproven treatments.   
 
A critic might respond that such patients are wronged because they 
are harmed psychologically; desperate volunteers are often upset to be 
presented with limited options and ex fortiori disappointed when 
allocated to the control group.  The wrong occurs if the RCT is 
unnecessary; the relevant information could be uncovered through 
other means such as alternative trial designs using patient preference 
models of consent48;49, historical controlled, and epidemiological  
studies.  Alternatively, RCTs could be run provided that patients had 
the option of receiving the experimental treatment outside of the trial. 
 
We accept that alternatives to RCTs should always be considered in 
order to avoid recruiting desperate volunteers.  However, the option of 
providing experimental treatments outside of the trial would be 
acceptable only where most potential participants are not desperate 
volunteers.  Desperate volunteers will always opt for the experimental 
treatment.  In some situations almost all potential participants will be 
desperate volunteers, as was the case in the trial from which we have 
taken quotes for this paper. A similar argument would undermine 
patient preference designs: desperate volunteers will always prefer the 
experimental arm of the trial.  Historical controls deliver poor quality 
data: a treatment effect would have to be very large with no obvious 
compounding factors for one tentatively to conclude that it is effective.  
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Hence if one were to have a treatment that had a useful but not 
spectacular effect in a desperate situation, one would have no way of 
discovering this fact.  The weaknesses of epidemiology are also well 
documented, a recent example being where RCTs revealed the falsity 
of the epidemiological studies suggesting the protective effect of 
hormone replacement therapy.50 
There is here a consequentialist counter-argument;5 desperate 
volunteers will find ways around the restrictions imposed by RCTs by, 
for example, mixing their drugs together to ensure they get at least 
some of the active treatment.  RCTs will then be less scientifically 
valid than other approaches.  This is perhaps more a practical than a 
moral consideration.  In most hospital based trials it could not occur.  
However, it should focus the minds of the researchers to the moral 
issue.  Our belief is that, in the desperate volunteer situation, if the 
question can be answered by an alternative to the RCT then it should 
be.  If an RCT is impractical because of desperate volunteer resistance 
then, in effect, the question cannot be answered to an extent that 
would undermine collective clinical equipoise.   
 
Hence there are two types of argument in favour of recruiting 
desperate volunteers to RCTs despite the fact that they would desire 
an alternative were it made available.  The first is, loosely, 
deontological: that people do not have a right to unproven therapy.  
(By “unproven” we mean that clinical equipoise exists in relation to 
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that therapy and the existing best alternative[s].)  The second is more 
consequentialist: disallowing RCTs where there are desperate 
volunteers would make it difficult to generate and test new treatments 
in areas such as neonatology and end of life care where desperation is 
commonplace.   
 
Closing remarks 
Collective, expert equipoise is a sine qua non for setting up a RCT.  In 
other words, there must be doubt in the clinical community about 
whether a new treatment is better overall than standard treatment.  
Personal equipoise on behalf of clinicians and participants is desirable 
and will be present in many cases.  However, personal equipoise 
should be seen as a prima facie criterion only.   
 
As a prima facie criterion, personal equipoise is defeasible. Collective 
equipoise trumps personal equipoise and, where it exists, there is a 
case for a RCT.  Nonetheless, the prima facie criterion sets an 
important limit.  If possible, trials should avoid recruiting desperate 
volunteers.31 However, as we have argued, there will be situations in 
which scientific investigation will require randomisation and the 
recruitment of desperate volunteers.  In those situations where 
desperate volunteers are recruited we should seek to minimise the 
negative effects, for example by using unequal randomisation in 
favour of the experimental arm in the trial design.51;52 
Desperate volunteers 
 24
Conclusion 
It can be ethical to run RCTs that recruit desperate volunteers 
provided there is collective, expert equipoise, throughout the course of 
the trial (as assessed by the DMEC and TSC).   
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